NCIA Staff
1978

The following report is a detailed account of the Juvenile Awareness Project Help (JAPH), an experiment in which youth are taken into the Rahway Prison in New Jersey. The program recently gained national attention through the film "SCARED STRAIGHT."

It is not difficult to understand why it caught the public eye; the brochure and publicity for the film make the following statements:

• Half of all serious crimes in the United States are committed by youths 10 to 17.
• VIOLENT juvenile crime between 1960 and 1975 TRIPLED!
• Existing deterrence programs or punishments seem ineffective as the number of juvenile crimes increases every year - twice as fast as adult crime!
• "Kiddie crime," as it's sometimes called, includes murder, rape, armed robbery, violent assault, mugging, robbery, arson, vandalism - hardly "kids stuff".
• In California, over a recent five-year period, crimes of violence committed by minors increased nearly 50%!
• Virtually all adult criminals were juvenile offenders. IF ONLY THEY COULD HAVE BEEN STOPPED THEN!
• 80% - 90% of the kids in THIS unique program are 'Scared Straight' Take an hour and watch this powerful approach work.

Given this background, it is also not surprising that one researcher has found that legislators in over 30 states have responded to public pressure and moved swiftly to replicate similar "miracle" programs.

This report contains the first systematic examination of the program. It asks and answers the questions we all should consider about the value and drawbacks of this or any program that hopes to help solve the serious problem of juvenile crime.

• What kind of youth are going through the JAPH?
• What are the actual success rates of the JAPH?
  
• Which agencies refer youngsters to the program?
  
• Does the program change the attitudes or behavior of juveniles?
  
• Are the juveniles being "Scared Straight" from any further trouble?
  
• Has deterrence, the theory upon which the program is based, been shown to be effective?

The actual research results are surprising, perhaps even shocking. The program does not demonstrate success in combating juvenile crime it shows just the opposite!

This, then, is a narrative of a controlled research study of the JAPH, conducted by Dr. James Finckenauer and researchers at the Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice. Rather than relying upon reported success rates, media accounts, and letters of commendation from parents or law enforcement people, it is our hope that legislators, judges, juvenile court officials, and anyone interested in the program will take the opportunity to read this report on that objective research.

The First Showing
On the night of November 2, 1978, TV Guide for the Los Angeles area listed an unusual offering on KTLA, Channel 5: "SCARED STRAIGHT! Special: Inside a maximum security prison. This hour-long program follows 17 juvenile offenders as they learn, at first hand, about the realities of prison life. Using brutally frank and frequently obscene language, 'lifers' at Rahway (N.J.) State Prison tell the young people about the ultimate payoff for their criminality" It went on to say that about 8,000 juveniles had visited Rahway and that 80% of them had been reformed by the experience "scared straight" The documentary was narrated by actor Peter Falk, and, to preserve its intensity, was run without commercial interruptions.

Scared Straight! played to a large and enthusiastic audience. There had probably never been a television documentary like it: the obscene language, the descriptions of violence and sodomy, the passionate intensity of the prisoners, the resonating steel sounds of cell doors slamming shut. "Please don't make me hurt you," a lifer spits in the face of a teenage boy, "because if I have to break your face to get my point across, I'll do it, you little dummy. You're here for two hours, you belong to us for two hours." One after another, the prisoners berate, rant, strut, and menace. "I'm bad, you see me, boy, I'm bad," snarls another. "You see them pretty blue eyes of yours? I'll take one out of your face and squish it in front of you." In prison, "the big eat the little."

Afterwards, the 17 boys and girls speak contritely to the camera. They announce stammeringly that they are through with crime and violence. Girls and boys alike: a total change of mind. Then Mr. Falk reappears, with the dreary fortress a compound of Rahway in the distance behind him, and tells the audience that six months after the filming all but one of the 17 had gone straight. And, he adds, 80% to 90% of all juvenile participants in the Rahway program have done the same.

Within 24 hours, Scared Straight! had become a celebrated cause. The Los Angeles press hailed it "One of the most riveting hours of television ever produced," said the Valley News. "One of the most unusual and powerful television programs ever broadcast," said the Times. "The holidays have come early to KTLA Channel 5," the Times reported. "Officials at the independent TV station have been celebrating all week, luxuriating in the good fortune bestowed on them by a Santa Claus called "Scared Straight." KTLA was flooded with appreciative letters: "It was like opening Christmas presents," said the station manager. More than 2,000 letters were received, including one from the mayor of Los Angeles.

Scared Straight! had been sponsored as a public service by The Signal Companies, Inc., a multiindustry company with headquarters in Beverly Hills. After the film's astounding success in Los Angeles, the Signal Companies decided to sponsor a nationally syndicated broadcast. Forrest N. Shumway, President and Chief Executive of Signal, explained why: "We feel that Scared Straight! is an example of public service documentaries at their best. If televising this film helps even 10 kids go straight, then it has been worth it." During the week of March 5, the program was shown from coast to coast in 200 major cities. Many viewers depending on the scheduling of local stations saw a half-hour sequel in which Dick Cavett discussed the Rahway program with Frank Bindhammer, a paroled convict and one of the founders of the project; Robert Hatrack, the warden of Rahway; Alan August, a Rahway official; and three of the juveniles who appeared in Scared Straight!

In April, 1979, Scared Straight! received the Academy Award for the year's best documentary. Arnold Shapiro, who wrote, produced, and directed the film, accepted the Oscar at the nationally televised Academy Award ceremonies.

"A Happy Ending"
It wasn't only the drama of Scared Straight! that captivated the press and public. There was an almost irresistible allure in the concept of the Rahway program. It had the trappings of a morality tale: hardened convicts, realizing the error of their ways, devoting themselves to saving others from the same bitter fate. It wasn't only the youths who were going straight. Mr. Shapiro understood why people like this film: "It has a happy ending. It suggested a path that works - and not only a path that works but one that doesn't cost us any money and can be put into effect immediately. The convicts are there."

There was little questioning that it worked. "Scared Straight!" declared a KFWB radio news editorial, "is the story about an idea. The idea is simple. It makes sense. It works." The press and public were excited by the 80% to 90% success rate cited by Mr. Falk in the film, though the evidence actually presented was 1) the claim that 16 of the 17 juveniles in the film had gone straight and 2) that they were a random group of violent or larcenous offenders. The Rahway program was now looked upon as something of a miracle cure for juvenile crime.

Professionals, too, were becoming interested in the Rahway concept. Pyramid Films in Santa Monica, California, which rented and sold Scared Straight! was deluged with hundreds of inquiries. The customers varied from the Los Angeles County Probation Department to the Beverly Hills Police Department, to a Los Angeles City Councilman, the Western San Bernardino Bar Association, the California Teachers Association, the Cook County Department of Corrections in Chicago, the North Carolina Justice Academy, U.S. Representative Glenn M. Anderson of California, and Grossmont College.

There was talk of exporting the Rahway program. "The single most gratifying thing of all," said Mr. Shapiro, "would be to see this Juvenile Awareness Program started in California prisons. That's what it's all about. That's the ultimate reward."

"The Places of Sad Men"
The Rahway program is properly called the Juvenile Awareness Project Help, with the acronym, JAPH. It was begun in September, 1976, by the Lifers Group at Rahway. The lifers had organized in 1975, and once JAPH was conceived, it became the group's raison d'etre.

In a write-up on their program, the lifers describe a typical JAPH session: "The young people are brought into the institution and are taken on a tour which consists of showing and explaining what an isolation cell is (the hole, used to house men who have committed rule infractions). A showing of a regular cell block with explanation. Then they are escorted to the prison auditorium where we have a rap session in which we try to cover the full spectrum of crime and its nonrewards. In these rap sessions we explain, using ourselves as examples, about prison, crime and its ramifications."

The program is designed to enlighten through shock treatment. "We are showing these young people," the lifers write, "that the stories about the big house (adult prison) being the place of bad men is in all reality the places of sad men. We are using ourselves as examples to prove the fact of what crime and its involvement is really all about."

The lifers tested their program by writing letters to the parents or guardians of juveniles who had visited Rahway, asking how the kids had fared afterwards. The lifers reported an astounding rate of success, and the newspapers spread the good news. "Since the program started seven months ago," said the Bergen Record, "the Lifers' Group has talked to 600 juvenile exoffenders. Only nine have been arrested again after the talks, all on minor offenses." Later, the Newark Star Ledger reported that the lifers' said of their success rate: "some 8,000 young people have participated and we have been able to reduce their recidivism rate from 86.2% to l0.2%."

A recidivism rate is arrived at after persistent follow-up, but few questions were asked about the accuracy of the lifers' survey. How many parents and guardians were contacted? How many responded? Over what period of time? What, exactly, was the lifers' definition of recidivism?

Estimates by the Rutgers researchers are that 40% to 60% of the juveniles who were visiting Rahway had never been inside an institution, gone to court, or even had police contact. They were average kids on class field trips. The lifers had no way of knowing, no way to find out, how they were affecting the young people who came to see them. Whatever data the lifers culled had to be approximate and, above all, incomplete.

In July, 1977, the New Jersey Department of Corrections decided to evaluate the Juvenile Awareness Project. The Department's methods were only slightly more careful or scientific than the lifers'; they spoke to no juveniles either before or after their trip to Rahway. Instead, the Department sent questionnaires to the agencies who were referring kids to JAPH, then called and held telephone interviews based on the questionnaires. Agencies included youth groups, high schools, and runaway programs. The theory behind the Rahway program, as the Department saw it, is deterrence the kids will be turned away from delinquent behavior when they see what that behavior may cost them.

The theory sounds good, but is JAPH scaring kids straight? Maybe. "Although there is no conclusive data," the Department said, "the program seems to be effective in changing juveniles' behavior." However, there was no mention in the Department's report of the 80% to 90% success rate.

Putting Theory to Test
In 1977, Dr. James 0. Finckenauer, an associate professor in the Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice submitted a proposal to the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency of New Jersey for a grant to evaluate the Juvenile Awareness Project Help with a team of researchers. The idea was to submit the results of the program to more intense analysis.

As was pointed out in his proposal: "The Honorable George Nicola, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Judge of Middlesex County, who is one of the creative sources behind the Lifers' project, indicated that deterrence, the 'need for youth to understand and appreciate the nonrewards of juvenile delinquency,' is one of the principles that ought to guide the juvenile justice system. Unfortunately, little or nothing is known about the deterrent effects ... Therefore, the Juvenile Awareness Project provides an excellent opportunity for trying to test the efficacy of the deterrence concept."

This was a moderate statement for Judge Nicola, who previously had recommended a program of sending youth to New Jersey reformatories as a "shock experience." Although he declared a similar 90% success rate for that program, he did not produce any statistically verifiable data to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency stating: "I just can't sit here and computerize it, but you can see it. It's based on my recollections." The NCCD noted that the records available did not substantiate that high rate of success.

The proposal noted that the concept of the Rahway program was not brand-new. In the 1960's, prisoners were speaking on crime and its consequences to religious, educational, and youth groups in more than 20 states. There was Operation Teenager in Texas, Prison Profiles in Illinois, Don't Follow Me in Colorado, and Operation Crime Prevention in Tennessee, to name a few. In all of these programs the prisoners described their early years, their progression from minor to major crimes, and the bitter climax of prison. Presentations were passionate and aggressive.

Evaluation of these programs, that we know of has been largely informal or incomplete. Colorado's Don't Follow Me program sent letters to former clients and reported a splendid success rate; but fewer than one percent of all participants were heard from. A field investigator commented on the Tennessee program: "Operation Crime Prevention seemed well regarded by the persons interviewed, with responses ranging from almost unlimited enthusiasm to mild praise. No one suggested that the program is not accomplishing its goals, which include the prevention of juvenile crime. However, there has been no systematic assessment of the effects of the program, nor is any such research under way." A 1970 study of high school predelinquents and forestry camp boys who had participated in the Prison Profiles program at the Illinois State Penitentiary found a slight but insignificant change of attitude. The study concluded that "predelinquents and delinquents are likely target groups for changing attitudes and, hopefully, behavior. The results indicate that they were not strongly influenced."

The Rutgers researchers were familiar with this data. In the proposal they stated what they expected to find: "The basic or key hypothesis of this evaluation is that the Juvenile Awareness Project has no effect, either psychologically or behaviorally, on the juveniles attending." This hypothesis, called a null hypothesis, was consistent with all serious research on such programs. "Delinquent behavior," the proposal suggested, "arises from a multitude of complex factors; therefore, we believe it is naive, simplistic and unrealistic to assume that a two or three hour visit to Rahway can counteract the long-term effects of all these other variables."

The grant to evaluate attitude changes and recidivism of juvenile graduates of the Rahway program was awarded. The research began in December, 1977.

Does it Change Attitudes?
The Rutgers researchers' first question was whether exposure to the Juvenile Awareness Project had any effect on the attitude of the juveniles who visited Rahway. Later on would come questions about any effect on behavior.

The research method was to take a random sample of about 100 juveniles who had been designated for a session with the lifers and randomly divide them into two groups. One group would visit Rahway; this group is called the experimental" group. The other would not; they are called a "control" group. Both groups would be tested twice on their attitudes toward the punishment of criminals, obeying the law, and concepts such as crime, justice, police and prison.

The researchers obtained a list of the New Jersey agencies that sent kids to Rahway in September, October, and November of 1977. Of the 49 agencies they chose 21, representing all of the various types of agencies counseling, police, educational, drug treatment, employment, recreational that were referring their young clients to the Rahway Program. There was considerable reluctance among the agencies to cooperate; ultimately, nine agreed. The juveniles 81 in all were typical of the boys and girls who were being referred to the Rahway program.

The "control" and "experimental" groups were tested to ensure that they were similar. Such factors as age, race, sex and delinquency probability were analyzed and the two groups were found to be well matched. The double round of tests began in February, 1978, and ended in November.

Quickly, during the first round, the researchers noticed something odd. There is a "test" for predicting juvenile delinquency called the Glueck Social Prediction Table, developed by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck in 1950, which classifies subjects into low, medium, and high probability of delinquent behavior. The Rutgers researchers discovered that over 70% of the 81 juveniles designated for the Rahway program had a low probability of delinquency according to the Glueck Table. About 20% had a medium probability, and only 8% had a high probability "If this is so," they wrote, "it raises several issues: Why do these particular kids need to attend the Project? Why are referring agencies not sending more high probability juveniles who might be more in need of deterrence? If the low probability of delinquency juveniles in fact do not become delinquent, can the JAPH claim credit?"

Training schools are for the worst and most persistent juvenile offenders, but another curiosity: not one of the 81 had ever been in a training school.

The researchers tested attitudes toward punishment of criminals with 34 different questions. The result: The juveniles in the experimental group who went to Rahway did not change their attitudes more than did a comparable control group of juveniles who did not attend the Project with one exception.

More specifically they found:

• no difference between the groups on their attitude toward law
  
• no difference between groups on their attitude toward justice
  
• no difference between the groups on their attitude toward the concept 'policemen'
  
• no significant variance between groups in their attitude toward punishment
  
• no effect upon ... self-perception.

As for obeying the law, "the experimental group shifted very slightly toward more favorable attitudes after participation in the Project" But the control group's change was "of somewhat greater magnitude." In other words those who did not visit Rahway improved their attitude toward the law slightly more than those who did.

The entire first report then found only one minor difference in the attitudes of the two groups. The juveniles who visited Rahway became more negative toward crime than those who did not, a change that obviously jibes with the claims of the JAPH enthusiasts. But the researchers point out, "The importance of this result rests in the possible interaction between attitudes toward crime and inclinations to engage in it" The attitudes toward obeying the law hardly changed after the Rahway visits, even though the youths tended to see crime as more "sad" and "ugly" and "worthless," among other things a half conversion, at best.

"The authors find no overriding reason at this point," they concluded, "to reject our hypothesis that the Juvenile Awareness Project has no effect on the attitudes of the juveniles attending... we maintain, until there is further evidence to the contrary, that it is probably simplistic and unrealistic to expect that a two or three hour visit to Rahway can counteract the long-term effects of all these other factors."

... And Does It Change Behavior?
"Deterrence," the Rutgers researchers began their second report, "has long been one of the fundamental goals of the criminal justice system, and more recently of the juvenile justice system as well. Unfortunately, little is known about the deterrent effects of exposure to these systems." In any case, the researchers went on, studies suggest that the certainty of punishment has more impact on crime than the severity. The lifers at Rahway can expound on the horrors of the place to their young audiences, but they cannot guarantee them that the kids are going to end up there if they steal a purse or sell some drugs. "Perceived severity," the researchers concluded, "has no particular deterrent effect."

Now, using the same groups of juveniles, 46 who visited Rahway and 35 who had been picked to do so but had not, the researchers went to work studying the juveniles' behavior. The researchers questioned the 80% to 90% success rate: "The basic hypothesis underlying the evaluation is that the Juvenile Awareness Project has no significant effect on the juveniles participating in terms of deterring their future delinquent behavior."

The recidivism research went like this:

• Six months or more after the experimental group visited Rahway and the other group had taken their first attitude tests, the researchers surveyed juvenile court records to see who had been arrested and why. The records included "offenses" of running away, and disobedience to parents as well as more serious behavior. Offenses that had occurred were carefully noted for degree of seriousness.
  
• Nineteen of the 46 who visited Rahway had no prior record. Twenty-one of the second group had none. The behavior of the two groups so far had been about even. But here's what the research found, six months after the 46 had gone to Rahway to be scared straight: "a significantly higher proportion of the juveniles who did not attend the Project did better in terms of subsequent offenses than did the group which attended" The graduates of JAPH were getting in more trouble than the kids who'd stayed home.
  
• Among the 27 who had prior records, 14 were successes after their visit to Rahway. That's a recidivism rate of 48.2%, which, as the researchers note, "is not only not better than, but in some instances worse than recidivism rates from other programs designed to prevent or treat juvenile delinquency."
  
• Six of the 19 who went to Rahway with no prior record were arrested within the next six months. Only one of the 21 with no prior record who did not go to Rahway was arrested subsequently.

"We have a group classification of the youngsters who may be taking part in our program," the lifers explain. "Our talks are geared to this classification... The Good (those with no involvement in crime). The Bad (minor infractions with the law or authority). The Ugly (those who have been away or are borderline cases). The study found that the lifers did better with the "good" than with the "bad" and "ugly;" but all three - "good" "bad" and "ugly" - who didn't go to Rahway were more successful than those who did.

And how about the seriousness of the crimes? Again, the JAPH graduates fared less well. "The experimental group did significantly worse than the control group" more experimentals than controls committed subsequent offenses and generally their seriousness was significantly greater.

What Should We Think?
Frank Bindhammer, the ex-lifer who helped found JAPH and who is now working for Signal Companies, Inc. promoting Scared Straight! and the extension of the Rahway program to other prisons, was interviewed in a piece in the April, .1979 issue of Human Behavior: "He admits that the program at Rahway in no way attacks poverty, a poor education, family difficulties, unemployment or racial discrimination the real causes of juvenile crime. What it does do, he says, is to get the kids' undivided attention so that counselors, probation officers and teachers at least have a chance of reaching them with alternatives to a life of deviance."

Maybe so. But in the April, 1978 issue of Crime and Delinquency, Richard J. Lundman and Frank Scarpitti looked at 40 juvenile delinquency prevention programs. "Our own research and the research of others" they wrote, "lead us to the nearly inescapable conclusion that few, if any, of these efforts successfully prevented delinquency." The authors suggest less optimism, for the moment: so far, the program hasn't been devised that will knock out juvenile crimes. With the best intentions, the lifers at Rahway can't transform city schools, poor and broken families, jobless summers. Too many of us, the Rutgers researchers write near the end of their report, "have failed to take account of these realities, and consequently have raised unrealistic expectations and goals for the Project." This research, like that of Lundman and Scarpitti, suggests that people consider sociological and psychological causes in future programs for delinquency prevention.

"There are no panaceas," Finckenauer's report concludes. "No cure aIls. There are no simplistic solutions. It is not possible to simply scare kids straight."

This report calls into question the success claimed for the Rahway program and the logic behind "scaring kids straight?" Clearly, the "success rates" are particularly misleading because a large proportion of referrals to the program had never been in trouble with the law.

• To be successful with school children and members of organizations such as Youth For Christ, the Boy Scouts, church groups, and so forth is not a major accomplishment for a juvenile justice program.
  
• The program would probably scare few youngsters who themselves were incarcerated in training schools, where they had already been exposed routinely to the types of brutality described by the lifers. Sadly, institutionally brutalized youngsters account for a disproportional amount of serious crime. It is highly unlikely that these youngsters would be "scared" away from a life of crime by a two hour relatively familiar experience.
  
• Unfortunately, those youngsters who would be scared by the program are those who do not "need" it and therein lies the program's major flaw: It deters youngsters who don't need to be deterred, and cannot affect those who do. Thus, the remarkable public acclaim presently surrounding this program is for the most part groundless, a product of excessive hope, not of a reasoned strategy for solving a severely troubling problem.